Conceptualization of Cognitive Relativism as a Socio-Cultural Problem [Концептуализация познавательного релятивизма как социально-культурной проблемы] | Научно-инновационный портал СФУ

Conceptualization of Cognitive Relativism as a Socio-Cultural Problem [Концептуализация познавательного релятивизма как социально-культурной проблемы]

Тип публикации: статья из журнала

Год издания: 2022

Идентификатор DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-0812

Ключевые слова: bullshit, cognitive relativism, g. frankfurt, knowledge, post-truth, s. fuller, socio-cultural problem, truth

Аннотация: The article is devoted to the consideration of cognitive relativism as a sociocultural problem expressed in the popular concept of post-truth. In approaches to cognitive relativism, two lines of thought are distinguished, which are analyzed on the basis of the well-known concepts of representatives of each of them - the concept of «bullshit» by G. Frankfurt and the version of the concept of «post-truth» put forward by S. Fuller. The difference between the concepts explaining the causes, consequences and strategies of behavior in the context of the social problem of cognitive relativism is due to the difference in the position regarding the objectivity of the opposition «truth-false». The realistic attitude to truth, from which G. Frankfurt proceeds, implies a view of relativism as bullshit - a way of utterance, which is characterized by cognitive «dishonesty», consists in the discrepancy between the content of the utterance and the real state of affairs, the truth. The relativistic attitude to truth is reflected in the understanding of post-truth by S. Fuller as universal for the history of thought of the struggle for power, which he traces from the time of the dispute between Plato and the sophists about truth. Each of the concepts expresses one of the possible lines of methodology and strategy of behavior in the conditions of prevalence of cognitive relativism in modern culture - the intention to overcome post-truth and return to the ideals of the validity of knowledge in the case of G. Frankfurt, and the intention to pluralism and free «knowledge game» in the case of relativists, in particular, S. Fuller. © Siberian Federal University. All rights reserved

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Издание

Журнал: Journal of Siberian Federal University - Humanities and Social Sciences

Выпуск журнала: Vol. 15, Is. 5

Номера страниц: 652-665

ISSN журнала: 19971370

Издатель: Siberian Federal University

Персоны

  • Korol N.A. (Siberian Federal University, Krasnoyarsk, Russian Federation)
  • Illarionov G.A. (Siberian Federal University, Krasnoyarsk, Russian Federation)
  • Kudashov V.I. (Siberian Federal University, Krasnoyarsk, Russian Federation, Krasnoyarsk State Medical University, Krasnoyarsk, Russian Federation)

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